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Abstract
Three experiments studied the hedonicity of decision making. Participants rated their pleasure/
displeasure while reading item-sentences describing political and social problems followed by
different decisions (Questionnaire 1). Questionnaire 2 was multiple-choice, grouping the items
from Questionnaire 1. In Experiment 1, participants answered Questionnaire 2 rapidly or slowly.
Both groups selected what they had rated as pleasant, but the 'leisurely' group maximized pleasure
less. In Experiment 2, participants selected the most rational responses. The selected behaviors
were pleasant but less than spontaneous behaviors. In Experiment 3, Questionnaire 2 was
presented once with items grouped by theme, and once with items shuffled. Participants maximized
the pleasure of their decisions, but the items selected on Questionnaires 2 were different when
presented in different order. All groups maximized pleasure equally in their decisions.
These results support that decisions are made predominantly in the hedonic dimension of
consciousness.
Background
"Gut reaction" is efficacious" [1]
For several decades, research in judgment and decision
making has examined behavioral violations of rational
choice theory [2,3]. For example, Baron showed convinc-
ingly that many decisions appear to be irrational, as if
decision-makers were indifferent to the consequences of
their decisions [2]. Erev and Roth showed that decisions
in gambling situations are made at low rationality, the
gamblers' aim being to maximize reinforcement [4,5].
Berridge concluded that a rational decision is a decision
that maximizes utility (with all the ambiguity contained
in the word utility) [6].
Epstein's [7] proposal of a "dual-process" in decision
making casts some light on that experiential" rational,
abstract, and analytical treatment of the available infor-
mation, and a second one, "experiential" and "emotion-
ally driven". According to Epstein, both systems fulfill
different functions. Loewenstein and co-workers [8] pro-
posed also an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-
as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect
experienced at the moment of decision making. Similar
views were expressed by Reyna & Farley [9]: "Risky deci-
sions making can be roughly divided into a) those [...]
that adhere to a rational behavioral decision-making
framework [...] and b) those that emphasize non-deliber-
ative reaction to the perceived gists or prototypes in the
immediate decision environment. " The experiential sys-
tem is present in animals and leads to effortless decisions.
The analytical system emerged more recently in humans
with the development of language. The present experi-
ments were developed in the same framework, exploring
hedonicity pitted against several variables involved in
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decision making: time available for decision making,
rationality, and recognition.
Maximization of hedonic experience is a universal mech-
anism inherited by humans to motivate behavior [10] and
makes pre-rational decisions [11-13]. Emotion interferes
powerfully with decision making [14]. Mellers recently
proposed an account of emotional experiences associated
with the outcomes of decisions called "decision affect the-
ory." It incorporates utilities, expectations, and counter-
factual comparisons into hedonic responses. That is,
people choose the risky options for which they expect to
feel better on average [15,16]. Conversely, positive moods
may increase sensitivity to the meaning-relevance of a sit-
uation [17]. Price et al. also have proposed a commonality
between cognitive processes underlying emotions and
choice [18]. Such views are similar to Cabanac's notion of
pleasure being the "common currency," if one accepts that
emotion is basically an intense hedonic experience [19].
Slovic and co-workers reached a similar conclusion, using
the terms affectivity and affect to qualify that something is
good or bad [20].
Optimization of everyday life decisions is similar in per-
ception and memory processes [21], which suggests that
the laws of mental optimization are similar and possibly
universal. In previous experiments we have studied the
place of pleasure in decisions made in various domains
[22,23], yet, it was noticeable that never, in any of our pre-
vious studies where we explored decisions in various
fields in relation to hedonic experience did any partici-
pant choose 100% responses providing pleasure. Thus,
other factors must enter, of course, into account besides
hedonicity. A recent review suggested that both rational
and intuitive decision making processes are likely to play
an important role in ethical decision making [24]. "A vast
area exists between irrational and rational that can be
called arational" [25]. In the present paper we examined
the hypothesis that such an arational process is actually
hedonic. We studied the influence of hedonicity in three
separate experiments. The aim of the present work was
double: first, to verify whether previous experimental data
showing the preeminent role of pleasure in decision mak-
ing, could be confirmed while the previous experimental
protocols were modified, and second, an attempt to falsify
our working paradigm by removing the tautology
involved in studies where participants rate hedonically
various items, then select those they prefer. Both aims
were tackled in the following experiments.
Methods
Participants
One hundred and twenty persons volunteered to partici-
pate anonymously in the study. They were recruited at
random on campus and in supermarkets. The only crite-
rion for selection of volunteers was a progressive attempt
to match, as well as possible, sex and age ratios in Experi-
ment 1, and then less so in Experiments 2, and 3. Each
person participated individually in a private interview.
The duration for answering Questionnaires 1 and 2
(below) were timed. The only personal data recorded were
participants' age and sex. Laval University Committee for
the Ethics of Research approved the study.
Questionnaires
The general principle consisted in presenting two ques-
tionnaires dealing with political and social problems.
Because Grammar, Mathematics, Aggressiveness and Eth-
ics had been studied in our previous studies, we explored
here a new field, politics. There were 10 general topics:
Irak war, Globalisation, Immigration, Family, Homosexu-
ality, Abortion, Genetically Modified Organisms (GM
Foods), North Korea, Palestine and Israel, and Cuba (see
Additional file 1). Each of the general themes was pre-
sented five times in a randomized order with each time a
different solution to the political/social problem, which
resulted in 50 items. The five possible solutions offered on
each theme tried to cover a broad spectrum of decisions
from staid conservative to extreme liberal.
In Questionnaire 1, the 50 items were presented one after
the other. The participants were invited to read carefully
the first item, then write down on an answer sheet the
amount of pleasure or displeasure evoked in them by that
item; pleasure and displeasure were considered as belong-
ing to the same dimension [11]. The quantitative rating
would be positive for pleasure, negative for displeasure,
and zero for indifference (or for "I don't know"). The
amplitude of the scale was left to the participants in order
to let them use a scale with which they would feel at ease.
Some chose from -5 to +5, others -10 to +10, or -20 to
+20, etc. Such a liberty was given because results would be
compared within each participant's results.
In Questionnaire 2, the 50 items of Questionnaire 1 were
presented grouped by five items on the same theme (see
Additional file 1). This resulted in a multiple-choice
Examination type with 10 entries, each containing all the
5 items on the same theme. The participants read the 5
items of the given entry and wrote on a new answer sheet
which political solution they would decide to choose, in
case were they in an executive position allowing decision
to be adopted. Any mention of hedonicity was carefully
avoided. Then the participants went to entry 2, then 3, up
to the 10th and made the same decisions.
Data analysis
Once the data had been collected for all participants, the
ratings on Questionnaire 1 and decisions on Question-
naire 2 were compared as follows: because all participantsBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:45 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/45
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adopted different ranges of ratings for Questionnaire 1,
we ranked them according to hedonic ratings rather than
comparing the absolute ratings given to the 5 items of
each theme. For each theme the lowest hedonic rating was
given rank 1, and the highest hedonic rating was given
rank five. Thus for each participant the total rating for the
10 entries could extend from 10, minimum, to 50 maxi-
mum possible. A total rating of 10 would mean that the
participant would have selected systematically in Ques-
tionnaire 2 the ten items most disliked, or least liked. A
total rating of 50 would mean that the participant would
have selected systematically the ten items that he/she
liked most, or disliked least. A total rating of 30 would
mean that the participant was likely to have selected at
random the items, as 30 is chance.
Experiment 1: Speed
"There are many different relationships and interactions
between time and decision making, and no single sum-
mary can do justice to this topic" [26]. In Experiment 1,
the duration allotted to answer Questionnaire 2 was
manipulated. The aim was to verify whether hedonicity
would be the deciding variable when people are in a hurry
to decide while they would be more rational when they
have the time.
Methods
In that study 60 participants, 30 men (m ± se, 51.6 ± 2.7
yr) and 30 women (50.8 ± 2.2) were presented with the
two questionnaires, as described above. The mean ages
were similar enough to be insignificant (Student's t = 0.2,
D.F. 58, P = 0.82). After reading and rating the 50 items of
Questionnaire 1 the participants were divided into two
groups before answering Questionnaire 2. The first group,
15 men (m ± se, 55.4 ± 3.5 yr) and 15 women (m ± se,
47.1 ± 3.5 yr) was casually instructed to take their time in
answering Questionnaire 2 without giving them any indi-
cation that duration of response was measured. As a result
they completed that Questionnaire in a m ± se, 6.0 ± 0.4
min.
The second group of 30 participants, contained also 15
men (m ± se, 47.9 ± 4.1 yr) and 15 women (m ± se, 54.6
± 2.5 yr). They were instructed to read the five topics of
each entry once and to decide quickly which political deci-
sion they would make. As a result they completed that
Questionnaire in a m ± se, 3.8 ± 0.2 min. The duration of
both groups thus differed by 2.2 min (Student's t = 5.0,
D.F 58, P < 0.0001).
Results and discussion
There was no influence of age (correlation 0.135, Z-value
1.025, P > 0.3) nor of sex on the decisions made on Ques-
tionnaire 2 (Fischer's PLSD, P = 0.91). Therefore no con-
sideration of this factor will be given in the following nor
in Experiment 2. The mean scores of selected items in
Questionnaire 2 (known from ratings of items in Ques-
tionnaire 1) was 41.4, i.e. way above chance: 30 (One-
sample t test = 76.1, D.F. 59, P < 0.0001).
The above analysis of Questionnaire 2 showed that all
participants had selected the items that they had described
as pleasant in Questionnaire 1. Yet the results of both
groups were different: the duration given to the partici-
pants to make a decision on Questionnaire 2 was highly
significantly influential (Fig. 1). The mean ranking of par-
ticipants who had time to decide (40.0 ± 0.7) was lower
than that of participants who were instructed to hurry to
decide (42.8 ± 0.7), (Fischer's PLSD, P = 0.011).
Ariely & Zakay [26] made an important contribution
when they showed that the time available for decision is
an important parameter in decision making. This was con-
firmed by Diederich [27]. The results of Experiment 1
result support their contention that the time allowed to
decide takes place in the process of decision making.
When time is scarce, decision-makers trust their hedonic
Mean results of Experiment 1 Figure 1
Mean results of Experiment 1. Participants rated 50 items as 
more or less pleasant to read (Questionnaire 1), then 
selected the ones they would decide to do (Questionnaire 
2). Ordinates indicate the number of times participants chose 
in Questionnaire 2 the most positively hedonic; minimum 30 
is chance, maximum 50 is systematic decision in favor of 
most pleasant items. Fast column gives the mean results of 30 
participants who were instructed to decide quickly on Ques-
tionnaire 2. Control column gives the mean results of 30 par-
ticipants who received instruction to take their time 
regarding decision on Questionnaire 2.
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experience. Such a difference might be related to the fact
that different brain structures are activated when decision
is urgent or may wait [28].
Even when they had to examine quickly the five items of
all 10 decisions to be made, the participants never selected
systematically the items which they had rated highest on
Questionnaire 1. Their decisions tended to be positive
and hedonically much higher than chance (41.4 vs. 30)
but they never reached the maximal possible rating of 50.
Such a difference between actual decision from maximal
possible pleasure leads one to suspect that other factors
than pleasure enter into play when a participant decides.
Such a factor could be rationality. When there is no time
pressure, the duration taken to make a decision is a func-
tion of the strength of the conflict between several possi-
ble solutions [27]. This was confirmed in the group of
participants who had time to weigh their decisions, as the
hedonicity of their final choices were lower than those of
control participants. One may suspect that rationality
entered into their decisions.
Experiment 2: Rationality
In Experiment 2, the participants were instructed to select
most rational issues in Questionnaire 2.
Methods
In that study, 60 participants, 37 men (m ± se, 54.9 ± 1.6
yr) and 23 women (51.0 ± 1.5), were presented with the
same two questionnaires, as described above. The mean
ages were similar enough to be insignificantly different
(Student's t = 1.4, D.F. 58, P = 0.16). After reading and rat-
ing the 50 items of Questionnaire 1, the participants were
divided into two groups before answering Questionnaire
2. The first group (control n = 33, 21 men and 12 women)
was asked to answer Questionnaire 2 without being
instructed about rationality; thus, they received the same
instructions as the control group in Experiment 1. The sec-
ond group (n = 27, 16 men and 11 women) was
instructed to answer rationally to Questionnaire 2 and to
decide in favor of the political decisions that appeared
most rational to them. All participants knew that they
could ask questions about the Methods; none of them
asked any question about the word 'rational,' thus indicat-
ing that they understood the word without ambiguity.
Results and discussion
Again as in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 there was no
difference between the results obtained from men and
from women (Fischer's PLSD, P > 0.13). There was no
influence of age (correlation 0.201, Z-value 1.541, P >
0.12) on the results from Questionnaire 2.
On the other hand, the rationality involved in making a
decision on Questionnaire 2 was highly significantly
influential (Fig. 2): the mean hedonic ranking of items
selected by participants from the control group was (43.2
± 0.7), i.e. 2.2 higher than that of participants who
decided rationally (41.0 ± 0.5, Fischer's PLSD, P =
0.0025). Still, Fig. 2 shows that the items selected on a
rational basis remained quite indicative of pleasure
choice, as the mean ranking of rational decisions was
more than 10 higher than chance (30). Such a correlation
of hedonicity with rationality supports the contention
that rational decisions provide pleasant experiences [29]
even if less pleasant than those of spontaneous decisions.
It follows that pleasure remains at the root of decision
making.
Experiment 3: Recognition heuristic
Gigerenzer and Todd [30] developed the fast-and-frugal
approach to modeling human decision making; they chal-
lenged the rational approach and argued that because
human decision-making process evolved in competitive
environments, they needed to be fast, and because they
evolved in changeable environments they needed to have
the robustness that comes from simplicity. Maximization
of hedonic experience fulfils both tasks. But, more specif-
Mean results of Experiment 2 Figure 2
Mean results of Experiment 2. Same protocol as in Experi-
ment 1 but the experimental group were instructed to select 
the most rational responses on Questionnaire 2. Ordinates 
indicate the number of times participants chose in Question-
naire 2 the most positively hedonic; minimum 30 is chance, 
maximum 50 is systematic decision in favor of most pleasant 
items. Rational column gives the mean results of 27 partici-
pants who were instructed to select the rational responses 
on Questionnaire 2. Control column gives the mean results 
of 33 control participants who received no instruction 
regarding rationality of decision on Questionnaire 2.
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ically, Goldstein and Gigerenzer [31] considered recogni-
tion as a way to be successful in repeated circumstances.
To explore the hypothesis of the previously evidenced role
of pleasure in decision making might depend on a simple
recognition of items by the participants, in Experiment 3,
we presented the same items twice in order to verify
whether participants would select behaviors that they had
previously preferred.
Methods
In that study 35 participants (21 men, m ± se: 51.6 ± 2.1
yr, and 14 women, 54.4 ± 1.3 yr. Fisher's PLSD, mean diff.
3.77, Crit. Diff. 4.8, P = 1.2), were presented with the two
questionnaires, as described above. However, in that
experiment, a different Questionnaire was presented
(Questionnaire 3). In it, all the items of Questionnaire 1
were arranged not by theme, as in Questionnaire 2, but on
the contrary were shuffled so that in each of all 10 entries
on that questionnaire the 5 items were mixed in order not
to have two items on the same problem (say, Irak, or abor-
tion) twice in the same entry. Thus, all items on the 10
entries were on different themes. E.g. instead of presenting
an entry with 5 different behaviors regarding, say, abor-
tion, the entry would contain one item on abortion, one
on immigration, one on Irak war, one on Cuba, and one
on GM food. After that additional Questionnaire 3, the
participant would return to the normal protocol, read
Questionnaire 2 with again the same items but this time
with all items grouped by theme, and decide which to
choose. The intention with the protocol of Experiment 3
was to familiarize the participants with the various deci-
sions and check whether recognition would influence
their decisions. If that is the case one would expect partic-
ipants to choose the same items in Questionnaires 3 and
2. What was counted for each participant, therefore, was
the number of coincidences when a given item had been
selected on both Questionnaires 3 and 2. The maximal
number would be 10 coincidences, as there were 10
entries on both questionnaires.
Results and discussion
In men and women the results were identical and super-
imposed therefore with those of the whole group: the
mean (± se) number of coincidences was: 5.1 ± 0.2, out of
a maximum possible 10, i.e. -4.8 lower than maximum
(Student's t, 30.6, D.F. 34, P < 0.0001). Thus, the partici-
pants chose predominantly the items that they had rated
as pleasurable, but recognition played little or no role in
their decisions, as the items selected five times out of ten
were not the same as those they had decided on Question-
naire 2.
Thus, if recognition influenced the participants' decisions
as predicted from Goldstein and Gigerenzer [31], that
influence was minor. Such a conclusion would confirm
the fact that a long delay of 77 +3 d placed between Ques-
tionnaires 1 and 2 produced the same results as the above
Experiments 1–3 (Bonniot-Cabanac & Cabanac, submit-
ted). Yet in that experiment, too, participants maximized
hedonicity in their decisions (m ± se) both in Question-
naires 2 and 3, with identical scores (43.1 ± 0.5) and (43.2
± 0.5). Such a result also confirms that participants tended
to maximize hedonicity, irrespective of the form of pres-
entation of the various problems where they had to make
decisions.
General discussion
The aim of the paper was to address the interplay between
hedonicity and choice. Specifically, we tested the hypoth-
esis that the amount of subjective pleasure associated with
a behavioral alternative affects that likelihood that this
alternative will be chosen by a decision-maker. In order to
test this hypothesis, the participants first assessed the
pleasure associated with a range of choice alternatives
(Questionnaire 1). Then they chose (Questionnaire 2).
The results showed that participants significantly chose
options that they had rated as pleasant, although they
didn't choose always the most pleasant ones, and some-
times chose clearly unpleasant ones.
A criticism raised sometimes by anonymous reviewers of
previous experiments has been that the approach with
two questionnaires may suffer from some tautology, as
one may expect the participants to select in Questionnaire
2 what they like. However the present work responds to
that criticism and removes the tautology, as the results
confirmed that the link between pleasure and decision did
not follow automatically the trend to maximize pleasure.
In none of the three experiments did any participant reach
the total maximum of 50 that would mean selecting sys-
tematically the most pleasurable items. The choosing of
pleasant items in Questionnaire 2, therefore, was not that
obvious and not as tautological as one might have feared.
Furthermore, the duration of the time available for deci-
sion making made a difference on their final choice: when
participants had time to weigh their decisions, they
selected pleasant responses, but less so than when they
had to rush to decide. The same pattern took place when
participants had to decide in favor of rational solutions.
The pleasure ratings of decisions actually made remained
vastly higher than chance, but nevertheless significantly
less pleasant than when participants had to decide with-
out focusing on rationality. Thus, the results failed to fal-
sify our working paradigm and confirmed pour previous
experimental data showing the preeminent role of pleas-
ure in decision making [22,32] although the previous
experimental protocols were modified.
Concepts of motivation are vital to progress in behavioral
neuroscience [33]. Our present results obtained both inBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:45 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/45
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Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2 confirm that the pleas-
ure experienced when the participants read different solu-
tions to political problems correlated with their
subsequent decisions on these items. Their pleasure/dis-
pleasure seemed to indicate the right solution whenever
they made a political/social decision and seemed to pro-
vide decision-making clues. The present results thus con-
firm the hypothesis that maximization of experienced
pleasure (i.e., experience value) and its counterpart, min-
imization of displeasure, occur in the decision-making
process. This confirms several results obtained in previous
experiments studying the role of pleasure on decisions in
conflicts of motivations for physiological behaviors [34],
and in various purely psychological fields: grammar, gam-
bling, mathematics, politics, poetry, aggression, etc.
[19,22,32,35] If we accept that emotion is "any mental
experience with high intensity and high hedonicity", then
the present results confirm the fundamental role of emo-
tion in decision making [36] and that emotional intelli-
gence predicts success in important domains, among
them personal and work relationship [37,38]. A recent
study showed that in absence of contextual cues or situa-
tional constraints, choices followed a pleasure-maximiz-
ing principle [39], a result closely similar to the present
ones.
There was no difference in decisions made by participants
whatever sex or age. The tendency to seek pleasure and
avoid displeasure thus appears to be deeply rooted in
human nature, as it covers a very broad area of the human
mind and is independent of decision-makers' sex and age.
This does not disprove Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz' [40] results
that demonstrate socio-ethnical influence in the solution
chosen to environmental risk, but shows that when a dif-
ference shows, it is more likely to be rational than
hedonic. Such a profound influence of hedonicity is likely
to be due to the antiquity of this mechanism, which is
present in animals, too [41].
The fact that the time allowed for decision was an influen-
tial variable (Experiment 1) also suggests that hedonicity
is the fundamental mechanism that takes place in emer-
gency when there is no time for deep evaluation. Slovic
and collaborators described recent empirical research illu-
minating "the affect heuristic" wherein people rapidly
consult their affective feelings when making judgments
and decisions. This heuristic enables us to be rational
actors in many situations. It works beautifully when expe-
rience enables us to anticipate accurately how we will like
or dislike the consequences of our decisions. However, it
fails miserably when the consequences turn out to be
much different than we anticipated. In the latter circum-
stances, the rational actor may well become the rational
fool [42]. Recent microeconomics studies of consumer
behavior showed that the price is traded in the buyers'
mind against other pieces of information such as
GMFoods influence on health, [43], or taste qualities of
drinks [44], and that the hedonic experience has a major
impact on final decision [45], a result confirmed by the
present paper.
"The sentiment of mathematical elegance is nothing but
the satisfaction due to some conformity between the solu-
tion we wish to discover and the necessity of our mind [...]
This aesthetic satisfaction is consequently connected with
the economy of thought" [46]. The hypothesis that hedo-
nicity is the main key in decision making [11,47] has
gained momentum in the recent years. Johnston [48] also
reached the conclusion that hedonicity is the dimension
of the mind that allows us to decide independently from
rationality. Thus hedonicity is likely to explain intuition
as a valuable and reliable problem-solving tool [49,50].
Decision-making seems to reflect two processes: a rational
one, when the subject has the necessary information and
cultural background, and a hedonic one, when the subject
cannot think through the situation for time pressure or
lack of information. The hedonic mechanism being more
archaic, for obvious reasons rooted in physiology, zool-
ogy, and anthropology [51,52], would be common to all
humans and would come into play when there is no time
to be rational or when rationality fails to provide a solu-
tion [11,42]. A similar conclusion was also reached by
Slovic and co-workers [12,20,42] who coined the term
"affect heuristic" for that process. The results are consist-
ent with the claim that non-rational processes contribute
to decision making. Another support to the hypothesis –
this time behavioral – can be found in the fact that path-
ological symptoms of stress occur when the algebraic sum
of effort and reward is chronically negative [53].
Hedonicity was shown also to influence decision indi-
rectly through the decision-makers' mood. Isen et al. have
repeatedly shown that not only was decision easier when
the decision-makers' mood was positive [54], but further
that the quality of their decisions was also improved
[55,56], another indication of the role of hedonicity in
decision making.
In conclusion, the results support the idea of a dual proc-
ess working of the mind. The elaboration likelihood
model (ELM) is a model of how attitudes are formed and
changed. Central to this model is the elaboration contin-
uum, which ranges from low elaboration (low thought)
to high elaboration (high thought) [57]. Central route
processes are those that require a great deal of thought,
involve careful scrutiny of the merits of arguments, and
therefore are likely to predominate in rationality. Periph-
eral route processes, on the other hand, do not involve
elaboration of the message and would predominate in
hedonicity.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:45 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/45
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The result would support the conclusion that the main
concern of decision makers is to maximize pleasure rather
than rationality in their decisions. Even when told to
make a rational choice, participants' decisions were close
to their hedonic choices. In the "time pressure manipula-
tion" in the first study, participants worked more under
"system 1" type of thinking, and therefore make more
"hedonic" choices. Although the a dual-process theory [7]
has been challenged [58], the present results are compati-
ble with Epstein's theory for decision making. Another
way to present it would be motivational rationality vs. log-
ical rationality [59]. The dual processes are rationality on
the one hand and hedonicity on the other hand, with the
later being the more fundamental one. When all of the
necessary information is provided and enough time [26]
is available, rationality and hedonicity tend to coincide, as
they often do [60]. Actually, in many circumstances of life
the hedonic choice is also the rational one. In such cases,
there will be no difference between choices made under
the two perspectives. When judging issues regarding dif-
ferent politics that are far from oneself (the war in Iraq,
North Korea, the Palestinians in Israel, or Cuba), the deci-
sion makers make their judgments from a psychological
distance. This perspective increases the likelihood that the
decision maker will view the same alternative as rational
and hedonic at the same time (since making a rational
decision about political/social problem for other people,
maximize one's pleasure, knowing "he did the right
thing"). If such a mechanism takes place, it emphasizes
the importance of hedonicity in the process of decision
making.
Yet, hedonicity can lead to non-rational decisions and,
consequently, its role is being recognized by more and
more authors [47,48,61-63]. The acknowledgement of
such a process in decision making has gained momentum
in recent years as was recognized as the root of wanting
[64], as the index of correct choice [65,66], as the antici-
pated source of reward in decision making [67], and espe-
cially in uncertain conditions when rationality is hindered
[68]. "Pleasure has a central role in human life" [69]. Such
a role is likely to be inherited from biology as hedonicity
seems to be the decision maker in animals too [41].
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